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Abstract—Mobile edge computing usually uses cache to sup-
port multimedia contents in 5G mobile Internet to reduce the
computing overhead and latency. Mobile edge caching (MEC)
systems are vulnerable to various attacks such as denial of service
attacks and rogue edge attacks. This article investigates the attack
models in MEC systems, focusing on both the mobile offloading
and the caching procedures. In this paper, we propose security
solutions that apply reinforcement learning (RL) techniques to
provide secure offloading to the edge nodes against jamming
attacks. We also present light-weight authentication and secure
collaborative caching schemes to protect data privacy. We evalu-
ate the performance of the RL-based security solution for mobile
edge caching and discuss the challenges that need to be addressed
in the future.
Index Terms—Caching, edge, security, reinforcement learning,
attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile edge computing provides data storage, computing
and application services with edge devices such as access
points (APs), laptops, base stations, switches and IP video
cameras at the network edge. Being closer to customers
than cloud, mobile edge computing can support the Internet
of Things (IoT), cyber-physical systems, vehicular networks,
smart grids and embedded AI with lower latency, location
awareness and mobility support [1]. Mobile edge caching
reduces the duplicated transmissions and backhaul traffic,
improves the communication efficiency, and provides quality
of services for caching users. Collaborative caching in mobile
edge computing shares popular data such as multimedia con-
tents in video games with augmented reality among end users
and significantly reduces the traffic load and service latency
in the 5G mobile Internet [2].
Security and data privacy are critical and become the bot-
tleneck for the development of mobile edge caching (MEC),
as edge devices are located at the edge of the heterogenous
networks and physically closer to attackers. With limited
computation, energy, communication and memory resources,
the edge devices are protected by different types of security
protocols, which are in general less secure compared with
cloud servers and data centers. In addition, mobile edge
caching systems consist of distributed edge devices that are
controlled by selfish and autonomous people. The edge device
owners might be curious about the data contents stored on their
cache and sometimes even launch insider attacks to analyze
and sell the privacy information of the customers. Therefore,
MEC systems are more vulnerable to security threats such
as wireless jamming, distributed denial of service attacks
(DoS), spoofing attacks including rogue edge and rogue mobile
devices, man-in-the-middle attacks, and smart attacks [3]–[5].
In this article, we briefly review the security and privacy
challenging of mobile edge caching and investigate the tradeoff
between the MEC security performance and the protection
overhead in terms of the computation complexity and time,
communication overhead and energy consumption. Edge de-
vices and mobile devices have different computing and storage
resources, battery levels, communication bandwidths and lo-
cations. Each node has to optimize its defense strategy and
choose the key parameters in the security protocols, which
are challenging in the heterogenous dynamic network as the
dynamic network model and attack model are difficult to
estimate. For instance, the test threshold as a key parameter
in the PHY-authentication is set based on the known radio
propagation and spoofing model, or a large number of training
data. However, neither the network model or the large volume
of training data can be readily obtained in time for an edge
node or mobile device to authenticate each received message
[6].
The dilemma in MEC security can be addressed by rein-
forcement learning (RL) techniques, which enable a learning
agent to derive an “optimal” strategy via trial-and-error. It
has been proved that Q-learning, the model-free and widely-
used RL algorithm can achieve the highest cumulative reward
in the Markov decision process (MDP) [7]. By applying
RL techniques, cyber systems such as AlphaGo have beaten
human players in various games and have attracted extensive
attentions from both academia and industry. In recent years,
RL techniques have been used to study the dynamic security
games, and the proposed RL-based security schemes such
as the anti-jamming channel access scheme, the authentica-
tion scheme and the malware detection scheme exceed the
benchmark deterministic schemes [6], [8]–[11]. Therefore, we
investigate the repeated game between the MEC systems and
attackers and discuss how to build the RL-based security
solutions, such as the secure mobile offloading against jam-
ming and smart attacks, the light-weight authentication with
multiple protection levels and collaborative caching to resist
eavesdropping.
We briefly review the RL-based security techniques and
compare their performance via simulations. The challenges to
implement the RL-based edge security solutions on practical
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mobile edge caching are discussed. Developed mostly for
games such as Go and video games, most reinforcement
learning techniques require the agent to accurately observe
the environment state and receive an immediate reward from
each action. Unfortunately, these conditions rarely hold in the
MEC security game and MEC systems have to be protected
from the security disasters due to the trial errors of the RL
algorithms.
This article is organized as follows. In the next section we
review the main security issues and present the attack models
in MEC systems. We then describe how to build the RL-based
MEC security solutions and evaluate their performance. We
also identify the challenges ahead and point out several possi-
ble directions for future work. Finally, we draw conclusions.
II. THREAT MODEL IN MOBILE EDGE CACHING
In mobile edge caching, adversary can compromise a num-
ber of “weak” edge nodes such as video cameras that are only
protected with light-weight authentication and encryptions. By
using the compromised edge nodes and/or commercial radio
devices such as laptops, an attacker can attack the mobile
devices and/or edge nodes. In addition, selfish customers and
curious owners of the edge devices who are hunger for secrets
and money also have motivations to attack MEC systems, if
they know their illegal gains do not incur any punishment.
Moreover, by applying advanced machine learning techniques
and smart radio transmission methods, a smart attacker can
learn the ongoing network status and chooses its attack strat-
egy accordingly and flexibly in each time slot, which makes
it more dangerous for MEC systems.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, mobile edge caching has to address a
large number of attacks during the mobile offloading procedure
and the caching perspective. During mobile offloading, the
radio communication channels of an MEC system are vulner-
able to the attacks launched from the physical layer or MAC
layers, such as jamming, rogue edge nodes/mobile devices,
eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle attacks and smart attacks.
The data stored in the cache of the edge devices have to be
protected to avoid privacy leakage. We briefly review some
important types of attacks as follows.
Jamming: A jammer sends faked signals to interrupt the
ongoing radio transmissions of the edge node with cached
chunks or caching users and prevent the caching users to
access the cached contents. Another goal of the jammers is to
deplete the bandwidth, energy, central processing unit (CPU)
and memory resources of the victim edge nodes, caching users
and sensors during their failed communication attempts [12].
DoS: DoS attacks are one of the most dangerous security
threats, in which attackers aim to break down the victim
computer network or cyber systems and interrupt their ser-
vices. MEC systems are especially vulnerable to distributed
DoS attacks, in which some distributed edge devices that
are not well protected by security protocols can be easily
compromised and then used to attack other edge nodes. Some
attackers also aim to prevent the collaborative caching users
from accessing the caching data. Jamming can be viewed as
a special type of DoS attacks.
Spoofing attacks/Rogue edge/Rogue mobile user/Sybil
attacks: An attacker sends spoofing signals to edge nodes
with cached chunks or the caching users with the identity of
another node such as the MAC address to obtain illegal access
of the network resources, and perform further attacks such
as DoS and man-in-the-middle attacks [6]. For example, an
attacker claims to be an edge node to fool the mobile devices
in the area in rogue edge attacks, or sends spoofing messages
to the edge node with the identity of another user in rogue
user attacks. Faked caching space claimed by the rogue edge
can result in significant data loss among the caching users in
the collaborative MEC shared with a large number of users.
In Sybil attacks as another type of identity-based attacks, a
caching user claims to be multiple users and request more
network and storage resources.
Man-in-the-middle attacks: Man-in-the-middle attacker
sends jamming and spoofing signals to fake an edge node [5]
with the goal of hijacking the private communication of the
victim edge nodes or mobile devices and even control them.
3Fig. 2. RL-based security solutions for MEC systems.
Privacy leakage: Some owners of the edge devices are
curious about the data stored in their caching and apply
machine learning techniques and data analysis software to scan
the caching data. In addition, the light-weight authentication
protocols cannot always prevent rogue caching users from
accessing the caching data. Therefore, MEC systems have
to protect the caching user privacy information such as the
preferences and travel histories of a specific user during the
mobile offloading and the caching process.
Smart Attacks: By using smart radio devices such as
universal software radio peripherals (USRPs), an attacker can
observe the network state such as the traffic pattern in the
area, compromise some edge nodes with insufficient security
protections, and wiretap the public control channels of the
edge network. The attacker can also use machine learning
techniques to investigate the network pattern and attack the
MEC systems accordingly and possibly with multiple steps.
For example, a proactive eavesdropper may first send jamming
or spoofing signals to the victim edge node to receive more
information from it. In [13], a smart attacker can choose the
type of the attacks according to its distances to the edge nodes,
which has been proved to be more dangerous to MEC systems
than the traditional attackers that can launch a single type of
attacks.
III. RL-BASED MEC SECURITY SOLUTIONS
Each edge device or mobile device in MEC systems has to
make a number of decisions to address the security threats
mentioned in the previous section. For instance, a mobile
device has to choose the data, the transmit power, channel
and time, and the edge node in the mobile offloading against
smart attackers who launch jamming, eavesdropping, rogue
edge, and man-in-the-middle attacks according to the ongoing
offloading policies and the network states. Most existing edge
security solutions are either fixed strategies based on a certain
fixed network and attack model or the optimization results
based on the accurate knowledge on a number of parameters
that are challenging to be obtained by an edge node in a
practical edge system, because many of the network and attack
parameters change significantly over time and are difficult to
be estimated. Therefore, an MEC system has to find a proper
security strategy without heavily depending on a specific
network and attack model, which cannot be formulated as an
optimization problem that is easy to address by an edge node
or mobile device.
This dilemma is promising to be addressed by applying
reinforcement learning techniques such as deep Q-network
(DQN) and RL-based security solutions enable a wireless
device to optimize its policy in the repeated security game via
trial-and-error. In the RL-based security scheme, a learning
agent such as an edge node or mobile device observes the
current state and a quality function or Q-function to choose
its action such as the security complexity and defense levels.
The state corresponds to the status of the other nodes in the
MEC system and the attack characters that can be observed by
the node. If the future reward to the node is independent of the
previous state for the given current state and strategy, the node
can achieve the optimal strategy after sufficient interactions
with the attackers in the dynamic edge system.
One of the first wireless security issues that apply reinforce-
ment learning techniques is anti-jamming communications [8],
[10]–[14], showing that a transmitter can use RL algorithms
such as Q-learning to optimize its transmit power and channel
selection in some simplified communication scenarios, such
as very few number of feasible actions and possible states,
without being aware of the network model and the jamming
model. As summarized in Table I, the RL techniques have also
been used in spoofing detection [6], [13], smart attacks [13]
and malware detection [9]. Therefore, reinforcement learning
is promising to improve MEC security, although the RL-based
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SUMMARY OF THE RL-BASED SECURITY METHODS IN WIRELESS NETWORKS
Attack RL techniques Action Performance Ref
Spoofing
Q-learning
Dyna-Q
DQN
Test threshold
Offloading rate
Auth. level
False alarm rate
Miss detection rate
Utility of the receiver
[6], [13]
Jamming
Q-learning
PDS
Hotbooting Q
DQN
Fast DQN
Channel selection
Power control
Offloading rate
SINR
BER
Energy consumption
[8], [10]–[14]
Eavesdropping
Q-learning
DQN
Fast DQN
Defense mode
Offloading rate
Secrecy data rate [10]
Malware
Q-learning
Dyna-Q
PDS
Offloading rate
Detection accuracy
Detection delay
[9]
MEC security solutions are complicated with more challenges
to address. For concrete examples, we show how to apply RL
techniques in the anti-jamming offloading, authentication and
anti-eavesdropping transmission issues as follows.
RL-based anti-jamming mobile offloading: In an MEC
system, a mobile device has to choose its offloading policy,
such as the part of the data to offload, the transmit power, chan-
nel and time, and which edge nodes to connect to, each from
a given finite feasible action set. The goal is to improve the
offloading quality such as the signal-to-noise-plus-interference
(SINR) and bit error rate (BER) of the signals received by the
edge nodes against jamming and interference and save the
computation and communication energy consumption.
As the future state observed by a mobile device is inde-
pendent of the previous states and actions for a given state
and offloading strategy in the current time slot, the mobile
offloading strategy chosen by the mobile device in the repeated
game with jammers and interference sources can be viewed as
a MDP with finite states [13]. Therefore, a mobile device can
apply reinforcement learning techniques to achieve the optimal
offloading policy without being aware of the jamming model
and the MEC model.
In the RL-based offloading scheme as presented in [9], the
mobile device observes received jamming power, the radio
channel bandwidth, the battery levels and the user density to
formulate the state. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the mobile device
chooses the offloading policy such as the edge selection and
offloading rate based on the current state and the Q-function,
which is the expected discounted long-term reward for each
action-state pair and represents the knowledge obtained from
the jamming defense history. The values of the Q-function are
updated via the iterative Bellman equation in each time slot
according to the current offloading policy, the network state
and the utility received by the mobile device against jamming.
The utility of the mobile device received in a time slot
is evaluated according to the anti-jamming communication
efficiency such as the SINR of the signals, the BER of
the received messages and the defense costs such as the
offloading energy consumption. In the DQN based offloading
scheme, convolutional neural networks (CNN) and the strategy
sequence pool as shown in Fig. 3 are used to estimate the Q-
values and provide a faster learning speed. The CNN consists
of two convolutional (Conv) layers and two fully connected
(FC) layers, and the weights of the CNN are updated based
on the stochastic gradient descent (SGD) algorithm according
to the previous anti-jamming communication experience in
the memory pool [12]. The output of the CNN is used for
estimating the values of the Q-function for each offloading
policy. By applying the ǫ-greedy algorithm, the mobile device
chooses the offloading policy that maximizes its current Q-
function with a high probability 1 − ǫ and the other policies
with a small probability. This scheme can make a tradeoff
between the exploration (i.e., to avoid being trapped in the
local optimal strategy) and the exploitation (i.e., to improve
the utility).
RL-based authentication: Due to the limited memory,
energy and computational resources, a mobile device usually
has difficulty estimating the ongoing spoofing model and
prefers the light-weight authentication protocols to detect the
identity-based attacks such as spoofing attacks, Sybil attacks
and rogue edge attacks. Each edge node also needs the fast
detection of a large number of spoofing messages and rogue
users. To this end, PHY-authentication techniques that reuse
the existing channel estimates of the source node and/or the
ambient radio signals provide light-weight protection against
identity-based attacks without leaking user privacy such as
their locations [6].
However, most existing PHY-authentication builds hypothe-
sis tests to compare the radio channel with the channel record
of the claimed node. Therefore, the receiver has to determine
the test threshold in the authentication for each incoming
message, which is challenging in the mobile edge caching
system with time-variant radio channel model and spoofing
model. This issue can be addressed by RL-based authentication
schemes, in which the key authentication parameters such as
the test threshold are obtained via reinforcement learning tech-
5Fig. 3. Illustration of the DQN-based secure offloading in mobile edge caching.
niques. For example, according to the RL-based authentication
scheme as developed in [6], an edge node observes the recent
spoofing detection accuracy and the spoofing frequency and
chooses the test threshold according to the Q-function which
is updated similar to the anti-jamming offloading mentioned
above. In another example, similar to [13], RL techniques
can be used for an edge node to determine its authentication
methods, i.e., the edge node automatically applies more au-
thentication protocols if finding itself in a risky network with
smart attackers.
RL-based friendly jamming: Secure collaborative caching
in MEC has to protect data privacy and resist eavesdropping.
For example, an edge node can send friendly jamming signals
according to the data stored in the caching system to prevent
the eavesdropping attacker from understanding the information
sent from a mobile node or another edge node. In this way,
each edge node has to determine whether to attend the friendly
jamming according to the network topology, the channel
models and the presence of the attackers. An edge node has
to decide whether to compute the data or to forward the data
received from the mobile device to the cloud, and whether to
store the “popular” data in the edge against privacy leakage
and DoS attacks.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
As a widely used RL algorithm, Q-learning has been applied
to resist spoofing, malware, jamming and eavesdropping in
wireless networks as summarized in Table I. Without requiring
any knowledge on the network and attack model, the Q-
learning based security schemes apply the iterative Bellman
equation to update the Q-values, and have two parameters,
i.e., the learning rate and discount factor to control their
learning performance. More specifically, the learning rate is
set to weight the current experience in the learning process
and the discount factor represents the uncertainty on the
feature rewards. In the Q-learning based authentication scheme
presented in [9], the learning rate is set as 0.7 and the discount
factor is 0.1 to achieve accurate spoofing detection. These
schemes can be easily implemented in mobile or edge node
with low computational and storage overhead, and enable it
to achieve the optimal strategy with probability one after a
sufficiently large number of interactions with the attackers in
a MDP even with randomness.
However, the Q-learning based edge security suffers from
the “high-dimensional disaster”, as the mobile or edge node
has to explore all the feasible state and action pairs to
understand the network and attacks before the network state
significantly changes or the attackers change their policies. It
has been found that the learning speed of a Q-learning based
scheme is usually slower than the network variation speed,
which seriously degrades the edge security performance.
Therefore, the Dyna-Q based security methods such as
the authentication scheme developed in [6] use both the real
defense experiences and the virtual experiences generated by
the Dyna architecture to find the optimal strategy. The Dyna-Q
based authentication scheme utilizes hypothetical experience
to accelerate the learning process and thus improve the spoof-
ing detection accuracy. However, the virtual experiences are
not always true especially at the beginning of the security
game, which decreases the learning rate of the security meth-
ods.
To address this issue, the edge security schemes based on
post decision state (PDS) [15] apply the known information
regarding the network, attack and channel models to accelerate
the exploration and use Q-learning to study the unknown state
space. On the other hand, the edge node without being aware
of any network model can resort to the DQN technique that
compresses the state space with deep learning. The DQN-
based security schemes converge to the optimal strategies
faster compared with the RL techniques mentioned above,
especially when the edge node witnesses a large network
state space. However, the implementation of the CNN in these
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Fig. 4. Performance of the RL-based offloading for a mobile device that is close to 3 edge devices against jamming.
schemes requires high computational complexity and memory,
which exceeds the capability of many edge devices and mobile
devices. To this end, a hotbooting method as a special case of
transfer learning exploits the learning experiences in similar
scenarios to initialize the weights of the CNN and reduce the
random explorations at the beginning of the learning process.
A fast DQN based anti-jamming communication method pre-
sented in [12] applies both DQN and the hotbooting technique
to improve the communication efficiency against jamming.
Simulations and preliminary experiments built on laptops
and USRPs show that the RL-based security solutions are
promising to improve edge security. For example, we con-
sider the mobile offloading of a user device with three edge
candidates in the area against a mobile sweeping jammer.
As presented in Fig. 4, the DQN-based offloading scheme
can significantly reduce the offloading energy consumption
and the delay, and increase the SINR of the signals received
by the edge nodes compared with the benchmark schemes.
All these schemes converge to the optimal strategy that can
be validated via the Nash Equilibrium of the repeated edge
security game after a sufficiently long time, although DQN
requires the shortest learning time.
V. CHALLENGES & FUTURE WORK
Most existing RL techniques are firstly developed for var-
ious games, in which a learning agent accurately knows its
state and immediate reward from each action (e.g., the change
of the scores in a video game). In addition, an agent can
tolerate most results of the feasible strategies especially at
the beginning of the game, which is the basis of the trial-and-
error methods. Unfortunately, these assumptions do not hold in
network security. For instance, a non-optimal network defense
decision sometimes leads to forbidding results such as national
safety risks. Although the RL-based security techniques are
promising to improve edge security and privacy, they have to
address the following challenges.
Inaccurate and delayed state information: An edge de-
vice usually has difficulty estimating the current network and
attack state accurately and fast enough to choose the next
defense policy. Therefore, the impacts of the inaccurate and
delayed state information on the MEC security performance
have to be investigated. We have to improve the MEC security
solutions with the advanced RL techniques that require less
state information and tolerate the inaccurate and delayed
state observation for 5G communication systems. A promising
solution is to incorporate the known network and attack infor-
mation extracted with data mining to accelerate the learning
process.
Evaluation of the utility for each security strategy: An
agent has to observe the security gain and the protection
cost to evaluate its reward from each action. Both in turn
consists of a large number of factors. For example, in a secure
mobile offloading, a mobile device has to accurately evaluate
the data privacy, the transmission and computation delay, the
energy cost and the rogue edge risks from its last offloading
policy, and incorporates them properly to evaluate the utility,
which is challenging for most practical MEC systems. The
5G communication systems have to investigate these factors
in the utility evaluation instead of using the heuristic model
used in most existing RL-based security schemes. It is critical
to replace the heuristic RL methods such as Q-learning in
the MEC security solutions with the newly developed RL
techniques that work well with delayed and inaccurate utility
information.
Makeup protocol for the bad RL decision: Existing
RL techniques require an agent to try some bad policies to
learn the optimal strategy. This exploration that is dangerous
for edge security indicates a large number of failed defense
against attackers. To this end, transfer learning techniques that
use data mining to explore existing defense experiences can
be designed to help RL reduce the random exploration and
thus decreases the risks of trying bad defense policies at the
beginning of the learning process. Backup protocols have to be
designed for the 5G system to avoid the security disaster from
a bad decision made in the learning process such as connecting
with a rogue edge.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we studied several security challenges in
MEC systems and proposed a security solution based on
reinforcement learning. The solution consists of a secure
mobile offloading solution against smart attacks, a light-weight
authentication and a caching collaboration scheme to resist
wiretaps. We applied RL to choose the defense levels and/or
key parameters in the process. The RL-based secure mobile
edge caching can enhance the security and user privacy of
7mobile edge caching systems. As shown in the simulation
results, the RL-based security solution is effective in protecting
the MEC systems against various types of smart attacks with
low overhead.
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